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I.  Introduction 
 
During the last three years New Zealand has faced increasingly large external 
imbalances.
 1  The current account deficit has increased from 4.3% of GDP in 2003 to 
almost 9.0% of GDP in 2005.   During the same period the country’s net international 
investment position (NIIP) has gone from a negative level equivalent to 78.5% of GDP to 
negative 89% of GDP.  Also, some of the most important macroeconomic variables – 
including interest rates and the exchange rate – have experienced a higher degree of 
volatility than in other commodity countries such as Australia and Canada.  Much of the 
growth in New Zealand’s external imbalances has been fuelled by a rapid real estate 
boom that has allowed consumers to withdraw significant amounts of money from their 
homes’ equities, and increase consumption.
2  These developments have generated 
concerns among experts and observers.  According to a recent article in the Financial 
Times (March 31
st, 2006, emphasis added): 
 
“Countries with large external imbalances such as Iceland and New Zealand, as 
well as Hungry…Turkey, Australia and South Africa, are seen as most vulnerable 
as foreign investors head for the exits.”
3 
 
  In an effort to cool down the economy, and to reign-in the rapid growth of 
housing prices, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has raised its official policy interest 
rate (the OCR) several times since January 2003.  At 7.25%, New Zealand currently has 
one of the highest policy interest rates in the world.  According to JP Morgan’s Global 
Data Watch, in mid-2006, only Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines and Turkey, among all 
large countries monitored by the investment banks, had higher policy interest rates than 
New Zealand.    
Although during the last few months the macroeconomic picture has changed 
somewhat – the NZD has weakened and increases in housing prices have moderated – a 
                                                 
1  See the IMF 2004 most recent reports for a broad analysis of New Zealand’s macroeconomic position 
and challenges; IMF (2006a, 2006b).  See also IMF (2004a, 2004b).   
2 See, for example, Robinson, Scobie and Hallinan (2006). 
3 Financial Times, “Iceland Acts to Head off Currency Crisis,” March 31
st, 2006.  In 
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/9d6a950e-c053-11da-939f-0000779e2340.html.  Emphasis added.   2 
number of important policy questions remain.  Perhaps the most important one is whether 
the very large current account deficit of 9% of GDP is sustainable.  If it is not – as many 
analysts have argued --, the next question is how will adjustment look like.  Will it be 
smooth and gradual, and thus with little or no real costs?  Or, will it be abrupt and severe? 
Another way of putting this issue is whether New Zealand faces a (relatively) high 
probability of experiencing a “sudden stop” in capital inflows, and an abrupt reversal in 
the current account deficit.
4   
Other important policy issues are related to the relationship between economic 
policy and external imbalances.  In particular, has macroeconomic policy contributed to 
the creation of these external disequilibria?  And, has monetary policy lost some of its 
power in the last few years?  This latter question emerges from the fact that, in spite of 
the increase in the OCR policy rate by 225 basis points between January 2004 and 
December 2005, longer term rates – including interest rates on mortgages -- have barely 
changed.   A central question, thus, is whether New Zealand should contemplate some 
changes in its monetary policy framework, and/or on monetary policy implementation.  
Other specific questions that have emerged from recent economic developments and 
debates include:   
 
·  Is the higher volatility in exchange rates and interest rates observed in New 
Zealand the result of a lack of synchronization between the New Zealand 
business cycle and the business cycle in the major economies (e.g. the G-3), or is 
it a reflection of structural weaknesses in New Zealand, including the fact that it 
is a very small, very open, commodity-exporting economy? 
·  Does the close economic relationship between New Zealand and Australia play a 
role in explaining the large and persistent imbalances?  
·  Should a small country such as New Zealand adopt the Greenspan view on asset 
prices, and ignore a property boom when conducting monetary policy?   
 
                                                 
4 The most recent IMF reports on New Zealand ask wheterh the current account poses macroeconomic risks 
to New Zealand; IMF (2006a, 2006b).  On “sudden stops” and external adjustment see, for example, 
Edwards (2004) and Calvo et al (2004).   3 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the potential consequences of New 
Zealand’s external imbalances.  A particularly important issue addressed in the paper is 
the possible nature of future external adjustments.  More specifically, I investigate what 
is the probability that New Zealand will undergo a costly adjustment characterized by an 
abrupt and large current account reversal.  This is an important question, since, as I argue 
in Section II, there are strong indications that the current magnitude of the external 
imbalance in New Zealand is not sustainable through time.  In order to achieve 
sustainability, the current account deficit will have to decline by 3 to % percentage points 
of GDP.  It makes a difference whether this adjustment is gradual or abrupt; there is 
ample evidence that suggests that abrupt current account adjustments (or reversals) are 
costly, in terms of lower GDP growth.  I deal with the question of the probability of 
experiencing an abrupt adjustment in the following way:  I analyze the main 
characteristics of countries that in the past have suffered “sudden stops” and abrupt 
current account reversals.  More specifically, I use random-effect probit models to 
estimate the determinants of the probability of experiencing a major reversal.  Once that 
is done, I estimate the estimated probability of reversals using New Zealand specific data 
at different points in time: I compute this probability using New Zealand data for the 
early 2000s -- when the current account deficit was 2.8% of GDP, a figure slightly lower 
than what many analysts consider to be sustainable -- and 2006, when the current account 
deficit is expected to be 9& of GDP.  This exercise allows me to evaluate whether, 
according to this model, the probability of New Zealand experiencing an abrupt and 
costly reversal has increased significantly in the last few years.  The paper also deals with 
monetary policy and its effectiveness in a context of large external deficits.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section II I analyze the evolution 
of New Zealand’s current account balances during the last two decades (the starting point 
of the analysis is 1985, when the NZD was floated).  I deal with real exchange rate 
trends, and with the evolution of different external accounts.  I focus on the recent 
evolution of New Zealand’s net international investment position (NIIP), and I discuss 
some recent computations on the sustainable level for New Zealand’s current account.  In 
Section III I provide an international comparative analysis of New Zealand’s current 
account balance.  I show that the persistence and magnitude of New Zealand’s deficit has   4 
virtually no comparison in the world.  I also provide some computations on the 
consolidated current account deficit of Australia-New Zealand.  I show that although this 
consolidated deficit is still large from an international perspective, it is smaller than the 
current New Zealand deficit.   Section IV asks whether New Zealand’s large external 
imbalances should be a cause for concern.  Recent evidence presented in Calvo et al 
(2004), Edwards (2004, 2004a, 2005a, 2005b) and Frankel and Cavallo (2004) suggests 
that countries that experience sudden declines in capital inflows and/or abrupt current 
account reversals have suffered significant reductions in the rate of economic growth.  In 
this section I use a multi-country data set to evaluate the probability that New Zealand 
will face an abrupt reversal in its current account in the near future.  Finally, in Section V 
I offer some concluding remarks.  In this concluding section I touch briefly on other 
policy options, including the merits of New Zealand and Australia having a common 
currency. 
  
II.  Twenty Years of Current Account Balances and the Exchange Rate Behavior 
in New Zealand 
In this section I analyze the evolution of New Zealand’s current account and trade 
weighted real exchange rate.  The analysis starts with 1985, the year New Zealand 
adopted a floating exchange rate.  The section is divided in three parts:
 5  First, 
(Subsection II.1) I discuss the evolution of the real exchange rate (RER) and current 
account during the last two decades.  I argue that it is possible to divide the last twenty 
years of RER behavior into seven distinct phases.  Second, in Subsection II.2, I discuss 
the most recent data on New Zealand’s current account, including its sources of 
financing.  Here I point out that in New Zealand, as opposed to the U.S. for example, the 
income account (which measures net interest, dividend, profits remittances and transfers 
to the rest of the world) has been the main source of disequilibria.  More recently, 
however, New Zealand has experienced an important deterioration in its trade account 
balance.  In Subsection II.3 I deal with the recent evolution of New Zealand’s net 
international investment position.   
                                                 
5   An interesting question – but one that is beyond the scope of this paper – is to compare exchange rate 
volatility (both unconditional and conditional) in New Zealand to that of other commodity currencies such 
as the Australian dollar and Canadian dollar.     5 
 II.1  The Current Account Deficit and Seven Phases of Real Exchange Rate 
Behavior in New Zealand 
In Figure 1 I present quarterly data for New Zealand’s current account balance as 
percentage of GDP, as well as on the evolution of the trade-weighted index of the NZ 
dollar real exchange rate for the period 1985-2005.  In this Figure – as in the rest of this 
paper --, an increase in the RER index represents a real exchange rate appreciation, while 
a decline in the index captures a depreciating trend.  Several interesting features emerge 
from Figure 1:  
 
·  First, it shows that deficits have been a “normal” state of affairs in New 
Zealand for the last 20 years.  In fact, going back for another ten years, 
one finds that in the second half of the 1970s current account deficits 
exceeded the 12% of GDP mark!   
·  Second, this Figure shows that while recent deficits have been very large 
indeed – in the order of 9% of GDP in late 2005 --, they have historical 
precedents.  Current account deficits reached that level (briefly) in early 
1986.   
·  Third, in the last twenty years there have been four episodes of 
retrenchment in the current account deficit.   
o  The first of these retrenchment episodes took place between March 
1986 and March 1989, when the deficit shrunk from 8.7% of GDP 
to a mere 0.7% of GDP; this has been one of the largest current 
account reversals in the modern economic history of advanced 
countries.   
o  The second external adjustment episode was brief and modest, and 
occurred between June 1990 and December 1991, when the deficit 
went from 4.2 to 2.8% of GDP.   
o  The third retrenchment was in the September 1997-June 1999 
period; the deficit declined from 6.7 to 4.0% of GDP.     6 
o  And the final deficit reduction episode took place during June 2000 
and December 2001, when the deficit declined from 6.5% to 2.8% 
of GDP.   
·  It is interesting to note that two of the current account retrenchment 
episodes discussed above were significant, exceeding 3.5% of GDP; these 
adjustment episodes, however, were stretched over a period of several 
years.   
·  Figure 1 also shows that during the period under study the RER index 
experienced significant movements: its mean was 91.0, its minimum 71.3, 
and its maximum was 108.0.  The standard deviation of the RER index 
was 8.9.   
·  Figure 1 shows a pattern of mild negative correlation between the trade-
weighted real value of the NZ dollar and the current account balance.  
Periods of strong dollar have, overall, tended to coincide with periods of 
(larger) current account deficits.  The contemporaneous coefficient of 
correlation between the (log of the) RER index and the current account 
balance is –0.22; when lead-lag structures are considered, the correlation 
coefficient declines.  This correlation between the trade weighted value of 
the currency and the current account is lower in New Zealand than in the 
U.S., where the contemporaneous correlation coefficient is -0.53, and the 
three quarters lagged correlation is -0.60.  This may be explained by the 
fact that in New Zealand the main component of the current account 
deficit is the incomes account, while in the U.S. it is the trade account.  In 
New Zealand the simple contemporaneous correlation between the (log of 
the) real exchange rate and the trade account to GDP ratio is -0.41. 
 
An analysis of the data in Figure 1 indicates that it is possible to distinguish seven 
distinct phases in New Zealand dollar real exchange rate behavior for the twenty-year 
period 1985-2005.  A brief analysis of these seven phases provides a summary of the 
history of New Zealand’s external sector since the inception of floating in 1985: 
   7 
·   Phase I:  March 1985-December 1985.  This phase was very short and 
includes the early months of floating.  It was characterized by a steep 
accumulated appreciation of the NZD of 17.3%.  During this short phase the 
current account deficit was very large.   
·   Phase II:  December 85-December 86.  This was also a very short phase.  
During these 12 months the NZD experienced a 9.4% cumulative 
depreciation.  During this phase the current account deficit began to decline.   
·  Phase III:  December 1986-June 1988.  This is the last of the “short” phases 
that occurred during the early years of floating.  During this period the NZD 
real exchange rate experienced a rapidly appreciating trend.  The trough-to-
peak change in the index was 22.3%.  Real exchange rate volatility – 
measured as the standard deviation of the monthly log differences of the RER 
index – was 0.023. Interestingly, during this phase the NZD strengthen in real 
terms at the same time as the current account deficit was declining in a very 
significant fashion.   
·  Phase IV:  June-1988-March 1993.  This is the first of four “long” phases in 
RER behavior; it is a depreciating phase.  As may be seen from Figure 1, 
between December 1988 and September 1990 the RER was quite stable, 
having reached a (temporary) plateau of sorts.  At that point, however, the 
depreciating trend resumed.  The peak-to-trough accumulated change in the 
trade weighted RER index during this period was -22.4%.  During the early 
part of this Phase the current account deficit widened.  Starting in late 1990, 
however, the deficit stabilized at slightly below the 4% of GDP mark.  During 
this period the standard deviation of the monthly log differences of the RER 
index was 0.022.   
·  Phase V:  March 1993-Match 1997.  This is phase is characterized by a 
trough-to-peak real exchange rate appreciation of 28.9%.  The strengthening 
of the currency was accompanied by a significant widening of the current 
account deficit.  Interestingly, during this phase real exchange rate volatility 
declined significantly; the standard deviation of the monthly log differences of 
the RER index was 0.011.  This is significantly lower than (real) exchange   8 
rate volatility in other commodity countries such as Canada and Australia 
(Edwards 2006).  
·  Phase VI:  March 1997-December 2000.  This is phase is characterized by a 
trough-to-peak real exchange rate depreciation of 32.4%.  During the early 
part of this phase the current account deficit retrenched to 3.9% of GDP in 
December 1998.  It then widened until it reached 6.5% in June 2000. During 
this period unconditional real exchange rate volatility increased to 0.023. 
·  Phase VII:  December 2000-December 2005:  This phase lasted the longest.  
During this period the real exchange rate appreciated by an impressive 51.5%, 
and real exchange rate volatility increased to 0.029.  From the third quarter of 
2001 through December of 2005 the current account deficit increased steadily 
from 2.8% of GDP to almost 9% of GDP.  During this phase the real 
exchange rate index experienced its highest degree of volatility, with a 
standard deviation of the log difference of 0.033. 
 
II.2  Decomposing the Current Account Balance 
Data Decomposition: In Figure 2 I go beyond the current account, and I present 
data from 1987 through 2004 for: (a) the balance of trade of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP; (b) the income account, also as a percentage of GDP, and (d) the 
transfers account as a percentage of GDP.   
A number of important facts emerge from these figures.  First, as Panel A shows, 
until September 2004 the trade account was mostly in surplus.  There were only two brief 
periods (in 1990 and 1999-2000) when there were small deficits – below 1% of GDP.   
However, since December 2004 (and until the time of this writing) the trade deficit has 
increased significantly, reaching its highest level since the adoption of floating exchange 
rates.  This recent emergence and prominence of the trade deficit suggests that in the 
recent years there may have been a structural change in macroeconomic relations in New 
Zealand.  The recent work by Kim, Hall and Buckle (2004) and Munro and Sethi (2006) 
suggest that a structural change in the economy’s ability to “smooth consumption,” may 
indeed have occurred.  I discuss this issue in greater detail in Section IV of this paper.      9 
Second, as may be seen in Figure 2.B, the incomes account has experienced very 
large deficits, and throughout most of the period under study it explains, more than fully, 
the current account deficit.  Only in the last year or so the income account deficit has 
been lower than the overall current account deficit.  The historically very large deficit in 
the income account in New Zealand is a reflection of the very large negative NIIP, a 
subject that I discuss in some detail in Subsection II.3.  An important question, and one 
that I explore below, is to whether New Zealand’s large negative incomes account 
balance is related to the close economic ties between New Zealand and Australia.    
Finally, Panel C in Figure 2 shows that the transfer account has exhibited a 
relatively stable surplus throughout the period under study.    
The Evolution of Savings and the Current Account:  The worsening in the trade 
balance since, approximately 2002, coincides with a significant decline in net household 
savings; this, in turn, has been associated to a rapid increase in housing prices.
6 In Figure 
3 I present data on the evolution of net savings for the period 1972-2005.
7  Several trends 
are apparent from this Figure.  Net national savings have experienced a declining trend.  
While during the early 1970s net national savings hovered around the 6% of GDP mark, 
during the last few years they have averaged less than 4% of GDP.   More impressive 
than this, however, is the fact that (net) household savings have declined very drastically 
since the mid 1990s, and in particular since 2002.  This rapid collapse in household 
savings has been partially offset by a rapid increase in government savings – which have 
recently surpassed 6% of GDP – and by a recovery of corporate savings since the mid 
1990s.  As pointed out above, the drastic decline in household savings has been related to 
a rapid increase in housing prices and, thus, in household wealth (See Robinson, Scobie, 
Hallinan, 2006)).  It is precisely for this reason that a number of analysts have argued that 
a moderation in New Zealand’s current account deficit will require a decline in housing 
prices.
8  This situation has also prompted the question of whether the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand should explicitly take into account real estate prices when conducting 
                                                 
6  On the recent evolution of housing prices in New Zealand see, for example, Robinson, Scobie and 
Hallinan (2006). 
7 The historical series are from Claus and Scobie (2002).  I have updated them using data from Statistics 
New Zealand. 
8  See, for example, Merrill Lynch, “NZD: The Long Slide,” Foreign Exchange Strategy, 13 April 2006.      10 
monetary policy.
9  In the light of low savings, a significant fraction of expenditure 
financing has taken place through the offshore capital market, via the issuance of New 
Zealand dollar denominated bonds – sometimes referred as Eurokiwis, NZD Eurobonds, 
and NZD Uridashis.
10   
 
II.3  The Evolution of New Zealand’s Net International Investment Position and the 
Financing of Recent Current Account Deficits 
  The counterpart to the large current account deficits of the last thirty years has 
been an increasingly negative Net International Investment Position (NIIP).   Figure 4 
presents the evolution of New Zealand’s NIIP since 1970.  The data have been taken 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006); when alternative New Zealand data sources are 
used the results are similar:  For instance according to New Zealand official statistics the 
in the period 2001-2005 the NIIP was  -76%, -80%, -79%, -82%, and -86%, respectively.  
These figures are not very different from those depicted in Figure 3.
11  Table 1 provides 
greater detail on the recent evolution of the NIIP, as well as of its most important 
components; naturally, the year-to-year changes in the different components of the NIIP 
provide information on the recent sources of financing of the current account deficit.  
Table 2 presents data on the recent evolution of this financing.  As pointed out above, 
during the last few years an important fraction of foreign financing to cover the current 
account deficit has been obtained in the offshore bond market or market for NZD 
denominated Eurobonds (Eurowiwis) or NZD denominated Uradishis, purchased by 
retail investor in Japan (Drage et. al. , 2005; IMF 2006a, 2006b). 
  As I discuss in some detail in Section III of this paper, New Zealand’s NIIP is one 
of the most negative (relative to GDP) in the world.  As a point of comparison the NIIP in 
the U.S. is currently -30% of GDP, and that of Australia is – 57%; see Table 6 below for 
details.  The NIIPs of most other advanced countries are, in fact, positive, denoting that 
these are net creditor countries. Figure 4 shows that in spite of some wave-like 
                                                 
9  This question is not unique to New Zealand.  It has been addressed several times in recent discussions on 
U.S. monetary policy.  See, for example, Ben Bernanke’s “The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current 
Account Deficit,” Speech delivered on March 10, 2005.  It may be found at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/default.htm  
10  For details on how the offshore market works, see Drage et. al. (2005). 
11 Using the Lane and Milesi-Ferreti data has two advantages.  First, they provide long time series, and 
second, it is easier to make comparisons across countries.   11 
movements, New Zealand’s NIIP has exhibited a declining trend through time, becoming 
increasingly negative.   
   In a recent important paper Munro (2005) discusses the evolution of the NIIP in 
New Zealand during the last few years.  Her most important findings may be summarized 
as follows: 
·  The increasingly negative NIIP of the last few years has been the result 
of private sector investment. 
·  New Zealand’s public sector net international investment position 
(including the New Zealand Superannuation) is virtually zero. 
·  The importance of bank loans has increased very significantly as a 
source of external liabilities.  Indeed, these higher bank loans have 
financed the real estate boom of the last few years. 
·  Given the currency composition of international assets and liabilities, 
New Zealand is not subject to significant “valuation effects” stemming 
from exchange rate changes. 
·  In the last few years the maturity of New Zealand’s external liabilities 
has declined. 
 
Modern analyses of current account sustainability are based on the notion that in 
equilibrium the ratio of the NIIP to GDP (or to some other aggregate) has to stabilize at 
some level.
12  The level at which the NIIP to GDP ratio will stabilize will depend on the 
attractiveness of the country’s assets to international investors.  If the international (net) 
demand for the country’s securities – including debt and equity – is high, the NIIP to 
GDP ratio will stabilize at a high rate.  The opposite will be true if this international 
demand is low.  The sustainable current account to GDP ratio will, then, depend on this 
long term stable NIIP to GDP ratio, and on the country’s long term trend rate of real 
growth and equilibrium rate of inflation.  The relationship between the equilibrium and 
                                                 
12 Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996), Edwards (2005).  For an illuminating sustainability analysis of New 
Zealand, see Munro (2005).   12 
stable ratio of NIIP to GDP – which I will denote as  g  -- and the sustainable current 
account deficit (SCAD) may be written as follows:
13 
 
(1)    ), ( p g + =
T g SCAD  
 
where  ) ( p +
T g is the nominal rate of growth of trend GDP,
T g is the long run trend real 
rate of growth of GDP and p  is the long run steady-state inflation rate (which I assume 
to be equal to the long run international rate of inflation).  According to this simple and 
yet powerful equation, the sustainable current account deficit will depend on both the 
international demand for the country’s assetsg  and the country’s nominal rate of growth.  
g , of course, is not an invariable number; as pointed out above, it is a variable, whose 
value changes through time, depending on the perceived riskiness and/or attractiveness of 
the country in question.                 
Munro (2005) presents calculations for the SCAD under alternative values of the 
long run steady state NIIP ratio and nominal rate of growth.  Munro’s computations are 
reproduced in Table 3.   The results in this Table are particularly interesting, in that they 
point out that even if the NIIP stabilizes at a significantly more negative level than the 
current -89%, and if nominal growth is very high by historical standards (say, 5.5% on 
average), the sustainable current account deficit is still significantly smaller than the 
current 8.9% of GDP.  The implications of these calculations are simple, and yet very 
important:  even under an optimistic scenario, where the (negative) NIIP stabilizes at a 
significantly more negative level (relative to GDP), and economic growth is very high, 
New Zealand will have to go through a substantial adjustment process where the current 
account deficit will have to decline significantly.  For instance, if from Table 3 one takes 
the combination of a NIIP of -120% of GDP and nominal growth of 5.0% of GDP, the 
“sustainable” current account deficit is 5.7% of GDP; this means that adjustment will 
have to exceed 3% of GDP.  But what is perhaps more telling is that these figures 
indicate that under rather small changes in the key parameters, the magnitude of the 
                                                 
13 See Edwards (2005) for a detailed analysis along these lines that incorporates the dynamic effects of 
changes in g .   13 
external adjustment required to bring the current account deficit in line with its long run 
sustainable level would be nothing short than brutal.  Take, for example, the case where 
the steady state NIIP is -80% (still a remarkably high figure from international standards) 
and nominal growth is 5%.  This combination implies a SCAD of 3.8% of GDP, more 
than 5 percentage points below its current level!   
A key question that emerges from this analysis – and one that I address in great 
detail in Section IV of this paper – is whether this external sector adjustment is likely to 
be gradual (and thus largely harmless from an economic point of view), or abrupt and 
costly.   That is, the question is whether international investors will slowly reduce the rate 
at which they add New Zealand securities to their portfolios, or whether this process will 
come to an abrupt and sudden end.   Before turning to this important issue, however, I 
tackle two important questions: (1) I analyze New Zealand’s external position in an 
international comparative context, and I show that New Zealand’s case is quite unique.  
And (2), I analyze the way in which New Zealand’s special economic relationship with 
Australia affects the NIIP and current account statistics.  I address these two questions in 
Section III of this paper. 
 
III.  The New Zealand Current Account in an International Comparative Context 
III.1  International Comparisons  
How large are New Zealand’s recent current account deficits, from a comparative 
point of view?  How does the persistence of deficits compare with that of other countries? 
And, how large is the (negative) net international liabilities position in New Zealand 
when compared, from a historical vantage, to that of other advanced countries?  In Table 
4 I present data on the distribution of current account balances in the world economy, as 
well as in six groups of nations – Advanced, Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa 
and Eastern Europe – for the period 1971-2004.  As may be seen, at almost 9% of GDP 
New Zealand’s deficit is very large from a historical and comparative perspective.  It is in 
the top decile of deficits distribution for all advanced countries in the first thirty years of 
floating.  As the data in Table 4 suggest, at this point New Zealand’s current account 
balance looks more like a Latin American or Asian country, than like an advanced nation.     14 
During the last 30 years a number of advanced countries, in addition to New 
Zealand, have had current account deficits in excess of 5% of GDP: Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Norway and Portugal.  What is 
interesting, however, is that very few advanced countries have had current account 
deficits in excess of 9%:  the only cases are Ireland in the 1970s and early 1980s; Malta; 
New Zealand; Norway and Portugal. 
What sets New Zealand truly apart is the historical persistence of its large current 
account deficits.  In Table 5 I present a list of countries with “persistently high” current 
account deficits for 1970-2004.  In constructing this table I define a country as having a 
“High Deficit” if, in a particular year, its current account deficit is higher than its region’s 
ninth decile.
14  I then defined a persistently high deficit country, as a country with a 
“High Deficit” (as defined above) for at least 5 consecutive years.
15  As may be seen in 
Table 5 the list of persistently high deficit countries is extremely short; only two of them 
are advanced countries, one of which is New Zealand during the 1980s.  This illustrates 
the fact that, historically, periods of high current account imbalances have tended to be 
short lived, and have been followed by periods of current account adjustments.  At the 
end of 2006 it is likely that U.S. will be added to this list; this would be quite remarkable, 
since it would be the first large country – either advanced or developing – to ever make it 
into this category.  It is important to notice, however, that even if in 2006 New Zealand 
still has a very large deficit, it will still not be classified as a new “persistently high 
episode.”  The reason for this is that it requires five years of being in the top 10% of 
deficits.   
The importance of the data on persistence in Table 5 is that they show that 
countries that run very large deficits don’t do that for very long periods of time.  
Countries that move to the “High Deficits” category stay there for short periods of time.  
Their external accounts adjust, and then move back to having a more “normal” deficit.  A 
key question is the nature of this adjustment.  As a number of authors have found out, 
countries that go through abrupt and sudden adjustments tend to experience significant 
                                                 
14   Notice that the thresholds for defining High deficits are year and region-specific.  That is, for every year 
there is a different threshold for each region. 
15   For an econometric analysis of current account deficits persistence see Edwards (2004).  See also 
Taylor (2002).   15 
declines in growth.
16  On the other hand, countries that experience a smooth adjustment 
do not suffer significant costs in their real economies.   
  In Table 6 I present data on net international liabilities as a percentage of GDP for 
a group of advanced countries that have historically had a large negative NIIP position.
17  
The data are taken from the comparative data set compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2006).  The picture that emerges from this Table confirms that New Zealand represents a 
unique case in terms of its external position; together with Iceland, it currently has the 
largest negative NIIP among advanced countries.  Moreover, New Zealand’s NIIP is 
significantly higher than that of other advanced nations.
18  As pointed out in the 
preceding section, the level at which the NIIP ratio stabilizes determines – jointly with 
other variables, such as the potential or trend rate of growth, and inflation – the 
sustainable current account deficit.  According to equation (1) above, if, for example, 
New Zealand’s NIIP stabilizes at 100% of GDP, trend growth is 3.5% and inflation is 
1.5%, the sustainable current account deficit  ) (SCAD is 5% of GDP, four percentage 
point below it 2005 level.   
   
III.2  New Zealand’s Close Economic Relation with Australia and the External 
Accounts   
  An important characteristic of the New Zealand economy is its (increasingly) 
close relation to Australia.  This is particularly the case with respect to investment in 
certain industries and sectors.  For instance, Australian investors are the predominant 
owners of New Zealand’s banking sector.  An important consequence of this close 
relationship is that it has an impact on the external accounts, and may make the situation 
appear more difficult than what it really is.  At the heart of this issue is the treatment in 
                                                 
16   Frankel and Cavallo (2004). 
17   For the U.S. the data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  For the other countries the data are, 
until 1997, from the Lane and Milessi-Ferreti data set. I have updated them using current account balance 
data.  Notice that the updated figures should be interpreted with a grain of salt, as I have not corrected them 
for valuation effects. 
18  During March-May 2006 international investors began to question the sustainability of Iceland’s 
external accounts.  This resulted in a decline in the demand of Iceland securities and in a drastic loss in 
value of the currency.  The central bank was forced to face this situation by substantially hiking interest 
rates.  See, for example, Bloomberg, “Iceland’s Central Bank Raises Key Rate to 12.25%,” May 18, 2006.  
Story may be found in:   
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=as0W.Z2_ykUA&refer=europe    16 
Balance of Payments accounting of reinvested earnings.  These are automatically (and 
simultaneously) recorded as an outflow in the investment income account and an inflow 
in the capital account.   This means that if firms use retained earnings as a recurrent 
source for financing their expansion in the normal course of their business activity, the 
external accounts will reflect a large current account deficit.   
As a way to gauging the importance of the “Australian connection” in explaining 
the magnitude and evolution of New Zealand’s current account deficit I analyzed the 
consolidated Australia-New Zealand NIIP, as well as the behavior of New Zealand’s 
current account deficit with Australia.
19     
  Table 7 presents New Zealand’s NIIP, explicitly detailing Australia’s net holdings 
of New Zealand assets.  Three main points emerge from this table: first, New Zealand’s 
NIIP vis-à-vis Australia is negative and equivalent to 24% of GDP; second, the share of 
the bilateral NIIP relative to Australia (as a proportion of total NIIP) doubled in merely 
four years; and third, the vast majority of Australia’s holdings of New Zealand assets are 
FDI (almost 50%).   This fact is particularly important, as it provides support to the 
notion discussed above regarding the long-run and ingrained relationship between the 
two countries.  In particular, the predominance of FDI suggests that Australian 
investments in New Zealand are unlikely to be subject to moody and knee-jerk reactions, 
and/or to sudden stops.
20 
Table 8 presents the consolidated NIIP for Australia-New Zealand. As may be 
seen, at – 61% of GDP the combined NIIP is still negative and large.  It is, however, 
significantly smaller than New Zealand’s NIIIP (89%).
21   Figure 5 presents the evolution 
of the current account deficit between New Zealand and Australia, and Figure 6 displays 
the components of the bilateral current account deficit between New Zealand and 
Australia.  As may be seen, during the 2000-2003 the bilateral deficit with Australia more 
than explained the aggregate deficit.  Also, Figure 6 shows that the bilateral investment 
income deficit is the more important component of the bilateral imbalance between New 
                                                 
19  I am grateful to Anella Munro for discussing with me this issue and, in particular, for providing me with 
the calculations on the Australian-New Zealand external accounts.  
20  Whether that is the case of other investments is less clear-cut. 
21  Naturally, it is larger than Australia’s NIIP of 57% in 2005.  However, since New Zealand economy is 
smaller than the Australian economy, the increase in the combined NIIP relative to Australia’s is not too 
large.   17 
Zealand and Australia.  The main conclusion of this “consolidated analysis” is that once 
the trans-Tasman relationship is taken into account, New Zealand’s external imbalances 
don’t look as large; they are still significant, but not as large as they appear when the 
aggregate data are considered. 
 
IV. Should New Zealand’s Large External Imbalance be a Cause for Concern? 
  In the preceding Sections I have analyzed New Zealand’s external conditions.  Six 
aspects stand out from this analysis.   
·  First, New Zealand has historically exhibited very large current account deficits.   
According to official New Zealand data the average deficit for the two first 
decades of floating was 4.8% of GDP.  The smallest deficit was 0.7% of GDP in 
March 1989, and the largest was 8.9% of GDP, a level achieved in December 
2005.  According to IMF data the average deficit was somewhat larger, at 5.4% 
of GDP.  But deficits have not only been large, they have also been persistent.  As 
shown in Table 5, New Zealand has been one of the few countries in the world 
that has had “persistently high” deficits. 
·  Second, at this time New Zealand has one of the highest current account deficits 
in the world.  In 2005, among the advanced countries, only Iceland and Portugal 
had comparable deficits.
22 
·  Third, the most important component of New Zealand’s large current account 
deficit is the investment income account.  In contrast with the U.S., until recently 
New Zealand’s trade balance was in surplus.  Only in 23004 the trade balance 
turned into a deficit.
23     
·  Fourth, New Zealand’s NIIP is one of the most negative among advanced nations.  
In part, this negative NIIP is attributable to the special relationship between New 
Zealand and Australia.   However, even when data for these two countries are 
consolidated the NIIP is very high from a comparative perspective. 
·  Fifth, New Zealand’s bilateral current account deficit with Australia is very high.  
During 2001-2003 this bilateral deficit explained more than 100% of the overall 
                                                 
22  Recent data suggests that in 2006 Spain will be added to this group. 
23  This assertion refers to the recent time.  During 1999-2000 the trade balance was slightly negative.     18 
current account deficit.  The most important component of this bilateral deficit is 
the investment income account.  This reflects the fact that Australian nationals 
have very large investments in New Zealand, and is (partially) the consequence of 
the accounting treatment given to retained earnings.  
·  Sixth, most analysts believe that New Zealand’s sustainable current account 
deficit is significantly lower than its 2005 level.  Although it is almost impossible 
to know what the precise level of the sustainable level is, most studies put it at 
between 4.5% and 5.5% of GDP.
24  This number is approximately 4% of GDP 
lower than the current account balance in 2005.    
 
Given the points made above, it is reasonable to ask whether the current very high 
deficit of the current account is a cause for concern.  A number of authors – most notably 
Max Corden (1994) have argued that very large current account deficits “don’t matter,” 
as long as they are the result of higher (private sector) investment and not the 
consequence of higher public sector deficits.  This is known as the “Lawson Doctrine,” or 
as the “consenting adults” view of the current account.  Since for many years New 
Zealand has run significant fiscal surpluses, this view implies that the large current 
account deficit of the last few years should not be a cause for concern.  According to this 
view adults know what they are doing, and thus are unlikely to overreact.  This means 
that the likelihood that there will be a sudden change in sentiments in capital markets is 
small, as is the probability of either a “sudden stop” or an abrupt and costly “current 
account reversal.”       
An elegant way of empirically addressing the question of whether large external 
deficits are worrisome is to investigate if they are consistent with intertemporal 
optimizing models that posit that savings and investment decisions (and thus the current 
account) are the result of optimal decisions by the private sector.  An important and 
powerful implication of intertemporal models is that, at the margin, changes in national 
savings should be fully reflected in changes in the current account balance (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 1996).  Empirically, however, this prediction of the theory has been 
                                                 
24 See Munro (2005) for a discussion on alternative estimates for current account sustainability in New 
Zealand.    19 
systematically rejected by the data.
25  Typical analyses that have regressed the current 
account on savings have found a coefficient of approximately 0.25, significantly below 
the hypothesized value of one.  Many numerical simulations based on the intertemporal 
approach have also failed to account for current account behavior.  According to these 
models a country’s optimal response to negative exogenous shocks is to run very high 
current account deficits, indeed much higher than what is observed in reality. Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1996), for example, develop a model of a small open economy where under 
a set of plausible parameters the steady state trade surplus is equal to 45 percent of GDP, 
and the steady state debt to GDP ratio is equal to 15.
26   The common rejection by the 
data of the intertemporal (or Present Value) model of the current account has generated 
an intense debate among international economists.  Some have argued that there is a 
group of “usual suspects” explain this outcome (Nason and Rogers 2006); others have 
argued that the problem resides on the low power of traditional statistical tests 
(Mercereau and Miniane 2004).   
In a recent paper using New Zealand quarterly data for 1982-1999, Kim, Hall and 
Buckle (2004) find that the implications of the intertemporal, present value model, of the 
current account cannot be rejected.  More specifically, they find that there is no evidence 
of consumption-tilting towards the present in New Zealand.  The authors’ main 
conclusions from this research are: 
 
“[1] Despite substantial deterioration in New Zealand’s current account deficits 
during the late 1990s, its current account movements over our sample period as a 
whole have been consistent with its intertemporal budget constraint and hence its 
formal external solvency condition has been satisfied; (2) The data is not 
consistent with consumption-tilting towards the present; (3) The current account 
paths predicted by our intertemporal optimisation models have satisfactorily 
reflected the actual directions and turning points for the consumption smoothing 
component of the current account.” (p. 25-26). 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1995), Gosh and Ostry (1997), and Nason and Rogers 
(2006). 
26   Ostfeld and Rogoff (1996) do not claim that this model is particularly realistic.  In fact, they present its 
implications to highlight some of the shortcomings of simple intertemporal models of the current account.   20 
 
These empirical findings led the authors to conclude that the available evidence suggests 
that the large deficits are no cause for concern.  The large imbalances were the result of 
optimal decisions, and would revert themselves smoothly in due course. 
The Kim, Hall and Buckle (2004) paper, however, did not include data for the 
2000-2005 period, when the current account deficit widened significantly.   In a recent 
paper Munro and Sethi (2006) revisit this issue, and provide new results for the 
estimation of the present value model of New Zealand’s current account using data for 
1982-2005.  Their results support those of Kim, Hall and Buckle (2004), and indicate that 
the main implications of the present value model cannot be rejected.  However, these new 
results by Munro and Sethi (2006) also suggest that the recent deterioration of the trade 
account is not consistent with the long-term solvency condition.  An important 
implication of this finding is that New Zealand’s external sector will have to go through a 
significant correction.   
In this Section I take a somewhat different approach to the question of whether 
the large current account deficits in New Zealand should be a cause for concern.  I use a 
broad multi country data set to investigate the determinants of the probability that a 
country experiences a sudden and large “current account reversal”.  I then use data on 
New Zealand to evaluate how likely it is that the country will face such a reversal in the 
near future.  I also analyze the evolution of the estimated probability of a current account 
reversal in New Zealand during the 1999-2005 period.
27 
The importance of analyzing the likely nature of New Zealand’s future adjustment 
stems from the fact that abrupt current account reversals have, historically, been 
associated with interest rates spikes, higher inflation, rapid currency depreciation and, 
more importantly, a significant decline in the rate of GDP growth.
28  According to 
Edwards (2005a), reversals have historically been associated with real depreciation 
ranging between 15% and 40%, and interest rates increases in the 240 to 570 basis points 
                                                 
27  The latest IMF reports on New Zealand (IMF 2006a, 2006b) analyze whether the large current account 
deficit poses risks for the country.  Although there is no empirical investigation, the authors of the report 
review work on reversals.  On the bases of that review the IMF (2006b”, p. 11) conclude that “the current 
account deficit poses no immediate threat to macro stability.   
28 Calvo et al (204), Edwards (205b), and Frankel and Cavallo (2004).  See the discussion below for a 
comparison of GDP growth in New Zealand during reversal and non-reversal years.   21 
range.  I addition, regression analyses in Edwards (2005b) indicate that countries that 
experience large and abrupt current account reversals have had, on average, a decline in 
GDP per capita growth that ranges from 2.5% to 5.5%. 
 
IV.1    Data and Empirical Model 
In this study I define a “current account reversal” (CAR) episode as a reduction in 
the current account deficit of at least 3% of GDP in a one year period.
29  In Table 9 I 
present data on the incidence of current account reversals for six groups of countries.  As 
may be seen, for the overall sample the incidence of reversals is 17.2%.  The incidence of 
reversals among the advanced countries is smaller, however, at 5.3%.  The advanced 
countries that have experienced current account reversals during the period under study 
are:  
·  Austria (1978, 1982),  
·  Canada (1982, 2000),  
·  Finland (1976, 1977, 1993),  
·  Greece (1986),  
·  Iceland (1978, 1983, 1986, 1993),  
·  Ireland (1975, 1982, 1983),  
·  Italy (1975, 1993),  
·  New Zealand (1975, 1976, 1983, 1988),  
·  Norway (1978, 1980, 1989),  
·  Portugal (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985),  
·  Switzerland (1981).
30   
 
As may be seen, during the last 35 the New Zealand experienced abrupt and 
significant current account reversals on four occasions; only Iceland and Portugal have 
                                                 
29 Later I also discuss results obtained when alternative definitions of reversals are considered in the probit 
analysis. 
30 In the analysis the basic cross-country data were obtained from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics, and from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  The figures may be slightly 
different from national sources’ data.  See Edwards (2005b) for alternative definitions of reversals.   22 
experienced as large a number of reversals.
31  It is interesting to notice that the average 
rate of growth of per capita GDP in New Zealand during the four reversal years – 1975, 
1976, 1983 and 1988 – was negative: -0.91%.  This is significantly lower than the 
average growth for the “non-reversal” years: 1.5%.
32  Moreover, in New Zealand, 
average real GDP per capita growth was also negative (-0.26%) one year after the 
reversals.  
In the regression analysis reported in this Section I focus on countries with a GDP 
in 1995 of at least USD 52 billion.   This allows me to focus on a group of countries that 
are somewhat homogeneous.   However, in the discussion presented below I also discuss 
results obtained when a large group of countries is included in the analysis.  The basic 
empirical model is a variance component probit, and is given by equations (2) and (3): 
 
1,    if   , 0
* > tj r  
(2)    tj r         =       
        0,  otherwise.    
 
(3)   
*
tj r    =     tj tj e aw + . 
 
Variable  tj r  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a current account reversal (as defined above), and zero if the country in 
question did not experience a reversal.  According to equation (2), whether the country 
experiences a current account reversal is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent 
variable
*
tj r .  
*
tj r , in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on vector tj w .  The error term 
tj e is given by given by a variance component model:   . tj j tj m n e + =    j n is iid with zero 
mean and variance
2
n s ;  tj m is normally distributed with zero mean and variance  1
2 = m s .  
                                                 
31  In its recent report on New Zealand the IMF (2006b) analyzes whether the reversal in Finland in 1993 
(as well as the milder adjustment in Sweden) offer lessons for New Zealand. 
32 See Edwards (2004) for a treatment regression analysis of the effects of reversals on GDP growth.   23 
The data set used covers 44 countries, for the 1970-2004 period; not every country has 
data for every year, however.  See Edwards (2005b) for exact data definition and data 
sources.   
In addition to the random effects model, I also estimated fixed effects and basic 
probit versions of the probit model in equations (2) and (3).
33  One of the advantages of 
relying on a probit model, such as the one described above is that they are highly non-
linear.  More specifically, the marginal effects of any independent variable on the 
probability are conditional on the values of all covariates.  This means that if the value of 
any of the independent variables changes, the marginal effect of any of them on the 
probability of the outcome variable will also change.   
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on 
external crises, sudden stops and reversals. In the basic specification I included the 
following covariates, which have data for a large number of countries and years:
34 
  
·  the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP, lagged one period.   
·  The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.   
·  An index that measures the effect of “contagion.”  This index is measured as 
the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s reference group of 
counties.  It is calculated, for each year and group, as the proportion of 
countries that experienced a “sudden stop.”  In this calculation data for the 
country in question are excluded.  In that sense, then, this “contagion” index 
measures the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the county’s immediate 
reference group.  For New Zealand the reference group is the “advanced 
countries.”  In the case of New Zealand, for 1970-2004 the contagion variable 
has an average value of 0.064, and a standard deviation of 0.047.  The lowest 
value of the “contagion” variable for New Zealand is zero (obtained in several 
years) and the highest is 0.19 (1973 and 1995).  I expect the coefficient of this 
“contagion” variable to be positive, reflecting the fact that when a similar 
country experiences a “sudden stop,” capital flows to the country in question 
                                                 
33  In the ‘basic probit” estimation, the error term is assumed to have the standard characteristics.   
34  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002).   24 
will tend to decline increasing the likelihood of a massive current account 
correction.
35  
·  Change in the logarithm of the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export 
prices to import prices), with a one year lag.   
·  The country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs).  This measures the degree of 
development of the country in question.  If more advanced countries are less 
likely to experience a reversal, its coefficient would be negative.   
 
In addition to the base estimates with the covariates discussed above, I also 




·  The one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic credit.  This is a measure of 
the monetary policy stance.   
·  A dummy variable that takes the value of one if that particular country had a 
flexible exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise.   
·  An index that measures the extent to which the country is dollarized.  If 
countries subject to “original sin” – that is, countries that are unable to borrow 
in their own currency are more prone to experience current account reversals, 
its coefficient should be positive.  The data for this index were taken from 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003).    
·  An index that measures cases of significant real exchange rate appreciation.   
This index takes the value of one if in a three year period the accumulated real 
exchange rate appreciation exceeds 30%.   
·  And, an index that takes the value of one if the country in question is a 
“commodity country,” and zero otherwise.   
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze formally the way in which the close 
relationship between two countries -- such as the one between New Zealand and 
                                                 
35  There are six groups.  Five of them are strictly regional, while the sixth refers to “advanced” nations and, 
thus, covers more than a region.  New Zealand belongs to the “advanced” countries group.   
36  Most of these variables have a lower number of observations than those in (a)-(e) above.    25 
Australia --, affects the probability of a current account reversal.  There are no readily 
available data on cross-country assets holdings such as that discussed in Section III.2 of 
this paper.  However, it is possible to perform some indirect tests on the way in which the 
trans-Tasman relationship between New Zealand and Australia is likely to affect the 
probability of a hard landing or abrupt current account reversal.  I do this in Sub-Section 
IV.X below, where I discuss the role of FDI on these probabilities.  
IV.2  Basic Results  
In Table 10 I present the basic results obtained from the estimation of this probit 
model for a sample of 44 countries.  In equations (10.1) and (10.2) the coefficients of 
both the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit are significantly positive, indicating 
that an increase in these imbalances increases the probability of the country in question 
experiencing an abrupt current account reversal.  All the other regressors in equations 
(10.1) and (10.2) have the expected signs, and are significantly estimated at conventional 
levels.  The results confirm the presence of a “contagion” effect, and that a deterioration 
in the terms of trade increases the probability of a reversal.  These results also indicate 
that counties with a higher (log of) GDP per capita have a lower probability of a reversal.  
When these equations were estimated using a fixed effects procedure, the results were 
very similar.
37   
In equations (10.1) and (10.2) the fiscal and current account deficits variables 
were introduced separately in the estimation.  In equation (10.3) I present estimates when 
both variables are included in the same probit equation.  As may be seen, in this case the 
coefficient of the (lagged) current account deficit continues to be positive and significant.  
However, the coefficient of the fiscal deficit ceases to be statistically significant.  This 
result is rather intuitive: higher fiscal imbalances that are not associated with a 
deterioration of the external accounts, do not affect in a significant way the probability of 
an abrupt current account reversal.
38  Equation (10.4) indicates that countries with a 
flexible exchange rate regime have had a lower probability of experiencing an abrupt and 
significant current account reversal. 
                                                 
37  In the fixed-effects estimation I used dummies for the different regions.  In this case (the log of) initial 
GDP became insignificant.  The reason for this is that the regional dummies capture income per capita 
differentials. 
38 The significant positive coefficient of the fiscal deficit in (10.2) is picking up the effect of the omitted 
current account variable.    26 
In equations (10.5)-(10-6) I report estimates with additional covariates.  The 
results are suggestive and confirm that countries with flexible exchange rates have been 
less likely to experience an abrupt current account reversal; they also indicate that a more 
expansive monetary policy has had a positive – although statistically marginal -- effect on 
the probability of a sudden current account reversal.  Interestingly the commodity, 
appreciation and dollarization variables are not significant in the estimation of the current 
account reversal equations.  All the estimated models presented in Table 10 performed 
quite well; the pseudo-R
2 ranged between 0.41 and 0.29. 
IV.3  Robustness Analysis  
Standard robustness tests were performed, including estimating the equations for 
alternative time periods, alternative data sets (larger number of countries).  I also re-
estimated the model excluding outlier observations.  Generally speaking, the results 
obtained suggest that the results reported in Table 10 are robust to specification, time 
period, country coverage, and the exclusion of “extreme values” of the different 
variables.  I also considered alternative specifications, and included additional variables 
that (potentially) capture the extent of external imbalances.   
The results presented in Table 10 consider the current account deficit as the 
measure of external imbalances, and don’t control by the country’s initial NIIP.  That is, 
it makes no distinction between countries with a large deficit and a very negative initial 
NIIP, and one with a very large deficit and a low initial GDP.   When the value of the 
initial NIIP to GDP ratio was included as an additional regressor its coefficient was 
negative, as expected, indicating that a more positive NIIP would tend to reduce the 
probability of a current account reversal.  However, the coefficient for this variable was 
statistically insignificant.  Moreover, its inclusion did not affect in any way the analysis 
on marginal effects on probabilities reported in Sub-Section IV.4.  
As an additional robustness test I also considered alternative definitions of 
“current account” reversals.  In particular, I re-estimated the probits when a reversal was 
defined as being a 4% reduction in the current account deficit in one year.  The results 
obtained – available on request – are very similar to those reported here.  The main 
difference is that when this stricter definition is used. The estimated coefficient of the 
initial (log of) GDP per capita was significantly negative.    27 
IV.4  Evaluating the Effect of a Larger External Imbalance on the Probability of a 
Major Current Account Adjustment in New Zealand 
The results reported in the preceding Sub-Section show that larger external 
imbalances – measured by the (lagged) current account to GDP ratio – have been 
associated with a higher probability of experiencing an abrupt (and costly) current 
account reversal.  However, the probit estimated coefficients reported above are difficult 
to interpret; it is not possible to know how the recent rapid growth in the current account 
deficit has affected the probability that New Zealand will face a current account reversal.   
Marginal Effects:  In order to address this issue in the Sub-Section I report the 
estimated marginal effects (and standard error) computed from one of the probit 
regressions reported above -- equation (10.4).  The marginal effects are estimated as the 
derivatives of the cumulative normal distribution with respect to the corresponding 
regressor.  These derivatives are then evaluated for given values of the independent 
variables.  An important property of probit models is that marginal effects are highly 
nonlinear and are conditional on the values of all covariates.  If the value of any of the 
independent variables changes, the marginal effect of any of them on the probability of 
the outcome variable will also change.  In the exercise reported in this Sub-Section I 
attempt to answer the following specific question:  “At the margin, by how much have 
increases in the current account imbalances affected the probability of an external crisis 
in New Zealand.”  In order to address this issue I follow a two steps strategy.  First, I 
evaluate the marginal effects at the values of the covariates that prevailed in New Zealand 
in the early 2000.  In particular, I use a value of the current account deficit of 2.8% of 
GDP, which corresponds to the year 2001.  (For the other covariates I use the following 
values:  Contagion=0.01; dlogtt=.03; logGDP0=9.43084; Flex=1).  Second, I re-evaluate 
the marginal effects using a significantly higher value of the external imbalance.  More 
specifically, I use a value of the current account deficit of 9% of GDP, which corresponds 
to New Zealand’s deficit in 2005-06.  In order to focus the analysis on the effects of the 
external disequilibria, in this second evaluation I maintain the assumed values of the rest 
of the covariates. 
The results obtained from the computation of marginal effects are presented in 
Table 11.  I present to sets of estimates -- “Early 2000,” and “High Imbalance.”  The first   28 
column contains the marginal effects obtained when equation (10.4) is evaluated using 
the values of the covariate corresponding to New Zealand in the early 2000s.
39  Four 
results stand out from Column 1:  (a) All, but one, of the marginal effects are significant 
at conventional levels.   (b) The marginal effect of the current account deficit is 
significantly positive.  Its point estimate, however, is rather low: a marginal increase in 
the deficit from its initial value of 2.8% of GDP increases the probability of reversal by 
only 1.2 percent.  (c) For this specific configuration of values of the key variables, the 
marginal effect of the contagion is rather large; the point estimate is 0.15, indicating that 
an increase in sudden stops in similar countries increases the probability of a reversal 
crisis by 15 percent.  And, (d) according to the estimate for “flexible exchange rate” a 
country that, with other things given, moves from a pegged to a flexible exchange rate 
regime reduces its probability of a crisis by 4.4%.   
The marginal effects in the second column of Table 11 also correspond to 
equation (10.4), but they have been evaluated for a value of the current account deficit of 
9% of GDP.  All other covariates continue to have the same values as in the first column. 
The differences between the “High Imbalance” marginal effects in Column 2 and the 
“Early 2000” marginal effects in Column 1 are very interesting and may be summarized 
as follows: 
·  The marginal effect for the current account deficit is four times higher 
in the “High Imbalance” case (Column 2) than in the “Early 2000” 
case (Column 1).  The point estimate, however, is still on the low side: 
0.050. 
·  The most important difference between these two estimates has to do 
with the marginal effect of “contagion.”  A country with a 9% of GDP 
current account deficit is significantly more vulnerable to contagion 
than a country with only a 2.8% current account deficit (other things 
being the same).  The differences in the marginal effect for contagion 
in these two estimates are indeed startling:  the point estimate increases 
                                                 
39  In these estimates the current account deficit – the variable of greatest interest – is given a value of 2.8% 
of GDP; this corresponds to the current account deficit experienced by New Zealand in 2001.   When 
alternative specifications of the probit equation are used to evaluate the marginal effects, the results are 
very similar to those discussed here.   29 
from 0.15 to 0.64.  Interestingly, these marginal effects for contagion 
are not very sensitive to the assumed value of the contagion variable 
itself; when I repeated this exercise using a value of 0.0 for contagion, 
its marginal effect was 0.14 for the “Early 2000” case and 0.63 for the 
“High Imbalance” case.   
·  The marginal effect of the “flexible exchange rate” variable goes from 
-0.044 to -0.13.  That is, the benefits of adopting a flexible exchange 
rate regime are three times higher for countries with (very) large 
current account deficits than for countries with moderate deficits. 
 
The results discussed above suggest that, although a higher current account deficit 
increases significantly the marginal probability of a reversal crisis, this is not its main 
effect; indeed, its marginal effect is only 5%.   From New Zealand’s point of view, the 
main consequence of the recent increase in the current account deficit is a very significant 
increase in its degree of vulnerability to contagion. 
The discussion presented above has focused on the marginal effects of changes in 
the current account deficit on the probability of experiencing a current account reversal.  
A related question – and one that is perhaps more relevant from a policy point of view in 
New Zealand – is how the rapid increase in the current account deficit has affected the 
overall predicted probability of an abrupt current account reversal in New Zealand.  This 
question is addressed in the last row of Table 11, where I report the predicted probability 
for the “Early 2000,” and “High Imbalance” cases.  As may be seen, the increase in the 
predicted probability of an abrupt current account reversal is significant.  It goes from 3% 
in the “Early 2000” case – a scenario associated with New Zealand in the early 2000s --, 
to 21% under the “High Imbalance” scenario.           
“Maxi” Current Account Reversals:  The results reported in Tables 10 and 11 are 
for current account reversals of at least 3% of GDP.  Historically, however, a number of 
countries have experienced more severe adjustments – say, 5% of GDP in one year.  This 
is usually the case when the international capital market turns viciously against a country, 
forcing it to adjust severely.  As Frankel and Cavallo (2004) and Edwards (2004) have 
shown, these more severe reversals are more costly in terms of GDP collapse.  In order to   30 
address this issue I estimated random effect probit equations of the type of (3) an 
alternative and stricter definition of current account reversal of 5% of GDP in one year.  
The regression results are in Table 12; the estimated marginal effects and predicted 
probabilities computed from equation (12.1) are presented in Table 13. 
As may be seen, qualitatively speaking the probit results are very similar to those 
in Table 10 for the 3% definition of reversals. The signs of the estimated coefficients are 
the same, and virtually the same variables are significant.   
The marginal effects and predicted probabilities, however, present some 
differences.  For every covariate the marginal effect is in Table 13 substantially lower 
than in the previous analysis.  As an illustration, under the “High Imbalance” case the 
marginal effect of the (lagged) current account deficit is now a mere 1.4%.  From a policy 
perspective, perhaps the most important result in Table 13 refers to the predicted 
probabilities of a “5% current account reversal,” for a New Zealand-like country.  As 
may be seen, the predicted probability in the “Early 2000” scenario is less than one 
percent (0.6%); under the “High Imbalance” scenario the predicted probability of a “5% 
current account reversal” is a mere 5%. 
The Role of FDI:  An interesting question is whether a large FDI component in 
capital inflows has an effect on the probability of experiencing a reversal.  This is 
potentially important, since New Zealand has traditionally had a large, positive and 
steady flow of FDI – mostly coming from Australia.  For the complete period, for 
example, the mean FDI to GDP ratio for New Zealand was 3.0%, and the standard 
deviation was 1.72.  For all Advanced Countries the mean was 1.80% with a standard 
deviation of 3.0%.  When the FDI to GDP ratio is added to the random effects probit 
equations, its estimated coefficient is negative and its p-value is 0.08.
40  This suggests 
that, with other things given, countries with a higher flow of FDI will tend to face a lower 
probability of experiencing a current account reversal.  
In order to investigate further the role of FDI, I computed the marginal effects and 
predicted probability of reversal under two assumptions for FDI behavior.  The first 
assumption is that the “high imbalance” – which as before is assumed to be characterized 
                                                 
40  This result is obtained when the FDI to GDP ratio is added to the specification in equation (10.1).  When 
added to the other specifications in Tables 10 and 12, the results are similar.   Notice that when this variable 
is added to the regressions the number of observations falls by approximately 50%.   31 
by a current account deficit of 9% of GDP – is fully financed by FDI flows.  In the 
second scenario, none of the “high imbalance” is financed by FDI flows.
41  The results 
obtained highlight illustrate of FDI.  When the deficit is fully financed with FDI the 
predicted probability of reversal is 12.1%; when FDI declines to zero, the predicted 
probability increases to 27%.  There is also an effect on the marginal contribution of the 
current account deficit: when FDI fully finances the imbalance, a marginal increase in the 
deficit raises the probability of reversal in 4%; when there are no FDI flows the marginal 
effect of the deficit increases to 6%.   These results shed some light on the importance of 
the trans-Tasman relationship between Australia and New Zealand discussed in Section 
III.2 of this paper.  As may be seen in Table 7, the stock of Australian FDI represents 
almost 50% of all FDI in New Zealand.  Moreover, FDI is more than 60% of all 
Australian assets in New Zealand.  Given the centrality of Australian FDI in New 
Zealand, and given that the probit analysis suggests that the trans-Tasman connection 
will, overall, tend to reduce the probability of New Zealand facing a hard landing.
42       
 
V. Concluding Remarks and Summary 
  This paper has dealt with a number of issues related to New Zealand’s external 
accounts.  I have shown that in a number of ways New Zealand’s situation is unique in 
the world economy.  The most important conclusions from the analysis may be 
summarized as follows: 
·  During the last thirty five years New Zealand has been one of the few 
countries with persistently high current account deficits.   
·  During this period has also been subject to a number of adjustments, including 
some characterized by large and rapid current account reversals (1975, 1976, 
1983, and 1988).  
                                                 
41  That is, in the first scenario the predicted probabilities and marginal effects are evaluated at values of the 
current account deficit of 9% and of FDI of 9%; in the second scenario, the deficit is 9% and the FDI ratio 
is zero.  
42  On the other hand, given the importance of the “contagion” variable in this analysis, if Australia herself 
is subject to a “sudden stop”, New Zealand is highly likely to go through a hard landing and an abrupt 
reversal.  Assessing the likelihood that Australia will experience a sudden stop is beyond the scope of this 
paper.        32 
·  The recent -- 2005 and projected 2006 – levels of the current account deficit 
are very large, both from a historical and comparative perspective.  Indeed, at 
9% of GDP, they are larger than most estimates of the “sustainable” current 
account deficit. 
·   New Zealand’s large negative Net International Investment Position (NIIP) is 
currently 90% of GDP.  This is a very large figure, both from a comparative 
perspective, as well as when compared with the evolution of the NIIP for New 
Zealand.  
·  In contrast with the U.S. the main source of New Zealand’s current account 
deficit is not the trade deficit.  Indeed, until recently the trade balance was in 
surplus.  The main source of New Zealand’s current account deficit is the 
investment incomes account. 
·  Having said this, in recent years the trade balance has turned into deficit, 
contributing to the large overall current account imbalance. 
·  To an important extent the (very) negative NIIP and (very) large current 
account deficit may be explained by New Zealand’s very close economic 
relationship with Australia.  In particular, the significant presence of 
Australian FDI in a number of sectors – including the banking sector – 
explains the large negative investment incomes account.  (Remember that in 
balance of payments accounting, reinvested earnings of foreign owned 
companies are treated simultaneously as an outflow in the investment incomes 
account and as an inflow in the finance account). 
·  Once the data are adjusted by the effects of the “Australian (or trans-Tasman) 
connection,” both the NIIP and the current account look less “threatening.” 
·  However, even after making the “trans-Tasman” adjustment the current 
account balance appears to be significantly larger than what is sustainable.  
This implies that at some point in the future New Zealand will have to go 
through an external adjustment process.  A key question is whether this 
adjustment will be gradual, and thus costless, or whether it will be abrupt and 
(very) costly.   33 
·  In order to address this issue I estimated a number of probit models to analyze 
the determinants of the probability of facing an abrupt current account 
reversal.  I evaluated these models using data for New Zealand in the early 
2000s – when the current account deficit was below 3% --, and in 2005-06, 
when the deficit is 9%. 
·  The main result from this analysis is that the rapid growth in the deficit during 
the last few years has (greatly) increased New Zealand’s vulnerability to 
“contagion.”  It has also increased the advantage of the country’s current 
floating exchange rate regime. 
·  The evaluation of the “predicted probability” of experiencing an abrupt 
current reversal indicates that the results depend on the magnitude of the 
reversal in question.  The probability of facing a “3% of GDP” reversal has 
increased to approximately 20%; on the other hand, the probability of facing a 
“5% of GDP” reversal as increased to (only) 5%.    34 
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Figure 2: Components of the Current Account Balance, 1987-2005 
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Source: Claus and Scobie (2002), updated using information from Statistics New Zealand  37 
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Figure 4: New Zealand Net External Position; 1970-2004 
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Table 1 
New Zealand Net International Investment Position 
At 31 March 
(NZ$ million and Percentages) 
 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
           
Direct Investment Abroad  -35,699  -40,565  -42,676  -54,901  -58,239 
  40.8  41.0  41.7  49.0  46.2 
           
Portfolio Investment Abroad  -34,400  -33,469  -40,410  -40,086  -43,292 
  39.3  33.8  39.5  35.8  34.3 
           
Other Investment Abroad  -29,916  -32,665  -26,353  -24,686  -31,074 
  34.2  33.0  25.8  22.0  24.6 
           
Financial Derivatives  3,989  -37  -1,993  -2,510  -2,345 
  -4.6  0.0  1.9  2.2  1.9 
           
Reserve Assets  8,566  7,723  9,115  10,093  8,828 
  -9.8  -7.8  -8.9  -9.0  -7.0 
           
Net International Investment Position  -87,461  -99,013  -102,318  -112,090  -126,121 
NIIP as % of GDP  -76.2  -80.1  -79.3  -81.6  -85.4 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand   41 
Table 2 
Net Financial Flows: 2003-2005 
(NZ$, million) 
 
Flow  2003  2004  2005 
       
Direct investment  3,252  4,949  4,123 
  Equity capital  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Reinvested earnings  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Other capital  5,306  2,586  1,561 
         
Portfolio investment  1,573  7,332  -150 
  Equity securities  -279  -2,518  -1,728 
  Debt securities  1,851  9,851  1,579 
         
Other investment  630  479  11,708 
  Trade credits  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  Loans  -969  -669  11,138 
  Deposits  1,364  668  1,078 
  Other instruments  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
         
Reserve assets  -1,345  -685  -3,475 
  Special drawing 
rights 
-8  -7  -4 
  Reserve position in 
the fund 
-304  284  361 
  Foreign exchange  460  -873  -3,627 
  Other reserve asset 
claims 
-1,491  -91  -205 
         
Total    4,110  12,075  12,206 
         
Current Account Balance  -5,937  -9,385  -13,688 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Table 3 
Sustainable Current Account Deficit under Different Scenarios 
 
 
Target IIP  Nominal GDP Growth 
(% GDP)  4.5%  5.0%  5.5%  5.8%  6.0% 
80  3.4  3.8  4.2  4.4  4.5 
100  4.3  4.8  5.2  5.5  5.7 
120  5.2  5.7  6.3  6.6  6.8 
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Table 4 
Distribution of Current Account Deficits 
By Region: 1970-2004 
 
Region  Mean  Median  1
st Perc.  1
st Quartile   3
rd Quartile   9
th Perc. 
             
  A: 1970-2004 
             
Industrialized countries  0.6  0.7  -3.8  -1.6  3.0  4.8 
Latin Am. and Caribbean  5.4  4.1  -2.5  1.1  8.0  16.9 
Asia  3.2  2.7  -7.0  -0.3  6.4  11.4 
Africa  6.3  5.3  -3.4  1.2  9.9  16.9 
Middle East  0.0  1.4  -18.8  -5.0  6.4  13.6 
Eastern Europe  3.9  3.0  -2.4  0.3  6.1  10.7 
             
Total  4.0  3.1  -4.4  -0.1  7.2  13.4 
             
  A: 1984-2004 
             
Industrialized countries  0.2  0.3  -4.7  -2.3  2.7  4.8 
Latin Am. and Caribbean  5.1  3.7  -2.5  1.1  7.0  17.0 
Asia  2.4  2.6  -8.2  -0.8  6.1  10.3 
Africa  5.9  4.6  -3.5  0.9  9.1  16.2 
Middle East  2.3  1.5  -12.4  -4.0  6.3  14.9 
Eastern Europe  4.0  3.1  -2.5  0.3  6.6  10.9 
             
Total  3.9  2.9  -4.5  -0.2  6.7  13.0 
             
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators 
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Table 5 
List of Countries with Persistent High Current Account Deficits 
By Region: 1970-2004 
 
Region/ Country  Period 
   
Industrialized Countries    
Ireland   1978-1984 
New Zealand   1984-1988 
Latin America and Caribbean   
Guyana   1979-1985       
Nicaragua   1984-1990 & 1992-2000 
Asia    
Bhutan   1982-1989 
Africa    
Guinea-Bissau   1982-1993 
Lesotho   1995-2000 
Middle East    
Lebanon  2000-2004 
Eastern Europe    
Azerbaijan   1995-1999 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators  
A persistent large deficit is defined as one that exceeded the ninth decile for the country’s region for at 
least five consecutive years.   45 
Table 6 
Net Sock of Liabilities: New Zealand and other Industrial Countries: Selected Years 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2004 
Australia  27.8  37.0  47.1  56.8  52.2  57.8 
Canada  34.2  34.3  34.9  29.9  7.2  12.5 
Denmark  30.9  52.6  41.6  23.8  14.5  12.4 
Finland  14.9  19.7  29.1  41.9  151.6  12.1 
Iceland  25.5  55.0  48.4  51.6  64.3  92.9 
New Zealand  30.3  70.9  62.4  103.3  74.8  91.9 
Sweden  8.6  19.2  23.7  36.1  0.6  9.5 
United States  -3.7  -0.3  4.6  5.5  16.8  22.6 
  Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).   46 
Table 7 
New Zealand’s NIIP: Total and Australia 
 
      2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
      New Zealand investment abroad 
Direct Investment Abroad  21,198  17,402  17,507  17,413  18,984 
  of which Australia  9,243  8,396  8,882  9,020  9,847 
  %  44%  48%  51%  52%  52% 
Portfolio Investment Abroad
(2)(3)  26,191  28,857  24,882  33,254  35,140 
  of which Australia  3,058  3,612  2,755  5,844  5,826 
  %  12%  13%  11%  18%  17% 
Other Investment Abroad  16,322  22,702  23,425  23,289  27,164 
  of which Australia  3,228  1,856  2,792  3,668  5,104 
  %  20%  8%  12%  16%  19% 
Financial Derivatives  12,476  6,074  6,781  6,081  7,841 
Reserve Assets  8,566  7,723  9,115  10,093  8,828 
Total New Zealand Investment Abroad  84,753  82,757  81,710  90,130  97,957 
  of which Australia  15,529  13,864  14,429  18,532  20,777 
  %  18%  17%  18%  21%  21% 
      Foreign investment in New Zealand 
Direct Investment in New Zealand  56,897  57,967  60,183  72,314  77,223 
  of which Australia  17,779  17,693  21,084  31,017  35,220 
  %  31%  31%  35%  43%  46% 
Portfolio Investment in New Zealand  60,591  62,326  65,292  73,340  78,432 
  of which Australia  3,129  3,735  6,582  8,655  9,034 
  %  5%  6%  10%  12%  12% 
Other Investment in New Zealand  46,238  55,367  49,778  47,975  58,238 
  of which Australia  7,642  11,383  11,152  10,021  11,815 
  %  17%  21%  22%  21%  20% 
Financial Derivatives  8,487  6,111  8,774  8,591  10,186 
Total Foreign Investment in New Zealand  172,214  181,770  184,028  202,220  224,078 
  of which Australia  28,550  32,811  38,818  49,693  56,069 
  %  17%  18%  21%  25%  25% 
           
Net International Investment Position  -87,461  -99,013  -102,318  -112,090  -126,121 
   of which Australia  -13,021  -18,947  -24,389  -31,161  -35,292 
   %  15%  19%  24%  28%  28% 
             
Gross Foreign Assets/GDP  74%  67%  63%  66%  66% 
Gross Foreign Liabilities/GDP  150%  147%  143%  147%  152% 
Net IIP/GDP   -76%  -80%  -79%  -82%  -86% 
             
    (of which Australia) 
Gross Foreign Assets/GDP  14%  11%  11%  14%  14% 
Gross Foreign Liabilities/GDP  25%  27%  30%  36%  38% 
Net IIP/GDP   -11%  -15%  -19%  -23%  -24% 
Source: Statistics New Zealand. 
I thank Anella Munro for providing me these data 
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Table 8 
Consolidated Australia-New Zealand (ANZ) International Investment Position 
 
      2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
      Australia-New Zealand investment abroad 
Direct Investment Abroad  220,440  270,315  219,087  255,288  294,943 
  of which internal  27,022  26,089  29,966  40,037  45,067 
             
Portfolio Investment Abroad
(2)(3)  203,957  226,923  189,782  244,270  272,830 
  of which internal  6,187  7,347  9,337  14,499  14,860 
             
Other Investment Abroad  107,492  113,817  101,424  114,507  115,954 
  of which internal  10,870  13,239  13,944  13,689  16,919 
             
Financial Derivatives  54,896  35,008  47,478  53,753  52,881 
             
Reserve Assets  51,359  47,870  45,190  65,225  60,063 
             
Total ANZ Investment Abroad  638,145  693,934  602,960  733,041  796,671 
  of which internal  44,079  46,675  53,247  68,225  76,846 
             
      Foreign Investment in Australia-New Zealand 
Direct Investment in ANZ  305,488  325,311  332,744  380,309  448,940 
  of which internal  27,022  26,089  29,966  40,037  45,067 
             
Portfolio Investment in ANZ  615,606  646,163  576,147  721,061  758,120 
  of which internal  6,187  7,347  9,337  14,499  14,860 
             
Other Investment in ANZ  202,505  201,914  198,142  211,426  222,433 
  of which internal  10,870  13,239  13,944  13,689  16,919 
             
Financial Derivatives  50,557  35,790  52,308  60,533  53,284 
             
Total Foreign Investment in ANZ  1,174,157  1,209,177  1,159,343  1,373,330  1,482,777 
  of which internal  44,079  46,675  53,247  68,225  76,846 
             
Net IIP/GDP   -56%  -50%  -56%  -58%  -61% 
Gross Foreign Assets/GDP  67%  68%  61%  66%  71% 
Gross Foreign Liabilities/GDP  123%  118%  117%  124%  132% 
             
    (excl internal) 
Net IIP/GDP   -56%  -50%  -56%  -58%  -61% 
Gross Foreign Assets/GDP  62%  63%  55%  60%  64% 
Gross Foreign Liabilities/GDP  118%  114%  111%  117%  125% 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, IMF International Financial Statistics, RBNZ estimates. 
I thank Anella Munro for providing me these data   
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Table 9 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals: 1972-2004 
 
Region  No Reversal  Reversal 
     
Industrial countries  94.7  5.3 
Latin American and Caribbean  80.3  19.7 
Asia  82.1  17.9 
Africa  77.2  22.8 
Middle East  83.5  16.5 
Eastern Europe  83.9  16.1 
     
Total  82.8  17.2 
     
    Observations  3.491   
    Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  90.58   
         Design-based F(5, 14870)  18.11   
          P-value  0.000   
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Table 10 
Determinants of Current Account Reversals 
Random Effects Probit Regressions 
  
  (10.1)  (10.2)  (10.3)  (10.4)  (10.5)  (10.6) 
             
Current-Acc. deficit to GDP  0.177    0.183  0.174  0.171   
  (8.65)***    (8.27)***  (7.82)***  (6.57)***   
Fiscal deficit to GDP    0.039  0.002    0.012  0.033 
    (2.56)***  (0.13)    (0.62)  (1.95)* 
Contagion  1.960  2.408  1.731  2.224  1.956  2.360 
  (2.74)***  (3.60)***  (2.35)**  (2.78)***  (2.20)**  (2.93)*** 
Terms of trade change  -0.012  -0.018  -0.012  -0.011  -0.013  -0.020 
  (2.27)**  (3.59)***  (2.25)**  (1.93)*  (1.77)*  (3.26)*** 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.053  -0.115  -0.062  -0.014  -0.081  -0.115 
  (1.02)  (2.09)**  (1.17)  (0.23)  (1.06)  (1.94)* 
Flexible        -0.397  -0.398  -0.264 
        (2.38)**  (2.18)**  (1.62) 
Commodity          0.089   
          (0.45)   
Domestic credit growth          0.0002  0.0001 
          (1.36)  (1.01) 
Dollarization index          -0.188   
          (0.82)   
Appreciation          -0.280   
          (1.15)   
Pseudo-R
2             
Observations  881  822  822  741  599  608 
Countries  42  40  40  42  35  36 
 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; All regressors are one-period lagged; constant term is included, but not 
reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   50 
Table 11 
Current Account Reversals: Marginal Effects and Predicted Probability 
 




     
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.012  0.050 
  (2.98)***  (3.80)*** 
Contagion  0.148  0.638 
  (2.59)**  (2.88)** 
Changes in terms of trade  -0.001  -0.003 
  (1.51)  (1.78)* 
GDP per capita  -0.001  -0.004 
  (0.23)  (0.23) 
Flexible  -0.038  -0.131 
  (2.27)**  (2.40)** 
     
Predicted Probability  0.029  0.208 
 
Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Table 12 
Determinants of Current Account Reversals: Reversal 5% 
Random Effects Probit Regressions 
 
  (12.1)  (12.2)  (12.3) 
       
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.138  0.147  0.144 
  (5.41)***  (5.25)***  (5.21)*** 
Fiscal deficit to GDP    -0.010  -0.015 
    (0.53)  (0.70) 
Contagion  3.117  2.917  2.896 
  (3.53)***  (3.14)***  (3.06)*** 
Terms of trade change  -0.009  -0.010  -0.009 
  (1.36)  (1.43)  (1.35) 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.116  -0.132  -0.195 
  (1.41)  (1.57)  (2.17)** 
Flexible  -0.455  -0.506  -0.557 
  (2.10)**  (2.23)**  (2.44)** 
Commodity      0.131 
      (0.57) 
Appreciation      -0.215 
      (0.76) 
Dollarization index      -0.406 
      (1.54) 
Pseudo-R
2       
Observations  741  694  685 
Countries  42  40  39 
 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; All regressors are one-period lagged; 
constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%. 
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Table 13 
Current Account Reversals: Marginal Effects and Predicted Probability 
Reversal 5% 
 




     
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.002  0.014 
  (1.65)*  (1.83)* 
Contagion  0.052  0.311 
  (1.77)*  (2.29)** 
Changes in terms of trade  -0.0002  -0.001 
  (1.03)  (1.20) 
GDP per capita  -0.002  -0.011 
  (1.43)  (1.58) 
Flexible  -0.013  -0.065 
  (1.80)*  (1.99)** 
     
Predicted Probability  0.006  0.047 
 
Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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